
Nellis v. Williamson County, Texas
The original complaint and the First Amended Complaint are below, in the words of the pleading. The home address, telephone, and email in the signature block are redacted on this page.
- Court
- United States District Court, Western District of Texas, Austin Division
- Case
- 1:26-cv-02592
- Updated
The filing
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION
LE ROY NELLIS II, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § Civil Action No. __________ § WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TEXAS; § WILLIAMSON COUNTY SHERIFF, § in official and individual capacities; § KATHLEEN A. POKLUDA; § DR. GHULAM M. KHAN; § JAMIE P. BROOKS; § EMT LARRY R. DAVIS; § EMT JOSHUA D. RANSOM; § SUPERVISOR REBECCA RODREGUEZ; § SUPERVISOR WILLIAM T. CALLAHAN; § SUPERVISOR BRUCE E. YOUNG JR.; § JOHN/JANE DOE JAIL ADMINISTRATORS; § JOHN/JANE DOE MEDICAL STAFF; § SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; § NCIC INMATE COMMUNICATIONS, INC., § § Defendants. §
COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (42 U.S.C. § 1983) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This action arises from unconstitutional pretrial punishment, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, sexual abuse, coercive restraint, denial of protective custody, denial of religious exercise, compelled surveillance, and retaliation imposed upon Plaintiff while confined as a pretrial detainee in the Williamson County Jail.
2. Plaintiff was presumed innocent at all relevant times and had not been convicted of any crime during the period of Defendants’ conduct.
3. Defendants denied and delayed emergency medical care during an objectively serious medical crisis, knowingly substituting unlicensed or improperly supervised personnel for licensed physician oversight in emergency medical decision-making, directly and proximately causing permanent neurological injury, metabolic disease, disability, and loss of bodily function.
4. Defendants subjected Plaintiff to prolonged isolation, coercive restraints, sexual abuse, humiliation, and punishment unrelated to any legitimate governmental objective.
5. Defendants compelled Plaintiff and his family to submit to AI-enabled surveillance of communications as a mandatory condition of confinement, without voluntary consent, judicial authorization, or meaningful opt-out.
6. Defendants’ acts and omissions were not isolated incidents but part of a continuous course of conduct involving repeated medical neglect, abuse, surveillance, and retaliation, resulting in cumulative physical, neurological, psychological, and reputational harm.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
8. This action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
9. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
III. PARTIES
10. Plaintiff LeRoy Nellis II is a resident of Texas and was a pretrial detainee in the Williamson County Jail from January 3, 2024 through July 2025.
11. Defendant Williamson County, Texas is a municipal entity responsible for jail operations, medical care, staffing, policies, and vendor contracting.
12. Defendant Williamson County Sheriff is the final policymaker for jail operations, supervision, training, discipline, and implementation of jail policies.
13. Defendant Kathleen A. Pokluda acted in a supervisory custodial and/or medical administrative capacity despite lacking proper licensure and lawful authority.
14. Defendants Ghulam M. Khan and Jamie P. Brooks were presented as medical supervisors or decision-makers despite the absence of valid physician licensure or lawful scope of practice during relevant periods.
15. Defendants Larry R. Davis and Joshua D. Ransom were EMTs exercising medical authority under color of state law.
16. Defendants Ramirez, Callahan, and Young were supervisory jail officials who denied Plaintiff requests for protection and failed to intervene despite known risks.
17. Defendants Securus Technologies, Inc. and NCIC Inmate Communications, Inc. operated exclusive inmate communications systems pursuant to contract with Williamson County and acted under color of state law by exercising custodial control over detainee communications, including interception, recording, retention, interruption, and automated or AI-assisted analysis as a mandatory condition of confinement.
18. John/Jane Doe Defendants include jail administrators, officers, and medical staff whose identities are presently unknown.
IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
A. Pretrial Status
19. Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee constitutionally protected from punishment and conditions not reasonably related to legitimate governmental objectives.
B. Medical Emergency and Deliberate Indifference
20. Shortly after intake, Plaintiff experienced gross hematuria, neurological symptoms, systemic infection, and metabolic instability.
21. Despite being a Type 2 diabetic, Plaintiff was forcibly administered insulin without adequate evaluation, informed consent, documented medical necessity, or physician oversight.
22. As a direct and proximate result, Plaintiff developed permanent insulin-dependent metabolic disease consistent with autoimmune or insulin-deficient diabetes requiring lifelong medical management.
23. Plaintiff urinated visible blood for multiple days and repeatedly requested emergency medical care and hospital transport.
24. There was no functional access to emergency services, including 911.
25. EMT Defendants denied hospital transport despite obvious signs of medical emergency.
26. Medical decisions were made by EMTs and non-physician personnel without timely or direct involvement of a licensed physician.
27. Plaintiff suffered permanent neurological injury, including loss of vision, diffuse nerve damage, chronic pain, disability, and loss of normal bodily function as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ acts and omissions.
C. Prolonged Isolation, Coercive Restraint, and Religious Abuse
28. Plaintiff was subjected to prolonged solitary confinement totaling approximately 326 days.
29. On or about August 13, 2024, Plaintiff was placed in isolation in multiple housing areas and restrained in a chair for approximately 2.5 hours for refusing to surrender his Bible.
30. The restraint and confiscation of religious materials served no legitimate security purpose and were punitive and coercive.
D. Sexual Abuse and Failure to Protect
31. Plaintiff was filmed while nude and exposed during custody.
32. Plaintiff was subjected to sexual abuse and sexual misconduct by staff.
33. Plaintiff requested protective custody on at least three occasions from supervisory staff, all of which were denied.
34. Defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff.
E. Compelled Surveillance and Attorney–Client Interference
35. Defendants required Plaintiff to use exclusive communications systems operated by Securus and NCIC as the sole means of contact with family and the outside world.
36. Use of these systems was mandatory; consent was coerced by incarceration.
37. Plaintiff’s family members—non-incarcerated civilians—were required to use proprietary applications as the sole means of communication, subjecting them to recording, retention, and surveillance without voluntary consent or meaningful alternatives.
38. The systems lacked reliable safeguards to exclude attorney–client communications from interception, recording, retention, or analysis.
39. Defendants knew or should have known that these systems created a substantial risk of intrusion into privileged communications, interfering with Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment right to confidential consultation with counsel.
F. Stigmatization and Reputational Harm
40. Defendants, acting under color of state law, publicly labeled or allowed Plaintiff to be characterized as a sex offender or pedophile on multiple occasions despite the absence of any conviction, adjudication, or lawful basis.
41. As a foreseeable result, Plaintiff lost both of his homes, suffered the breakdown of his relationship with his child, experienced widespread social ostracization, and lost his established social and professional network and online presence.
42. These actions imposed a stigma accompanied by concrete deprivations of liberty and property interests, violating Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
G. County Policy and Custom
43. Williamson County maintained policies and customs of understaffing, unlicensed medical supervision, ignored grievances, retaliatory isolation, and integration of surveillance technologies without constitutional safeguards.
44. Defendants were on notice of these practices through grievances, requests, injuries, and prior incidents and failed to act.
V. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I – Fourteenth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
45. Defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm.
COUNT II – Fourteenth Amendment Unconstitutional Pretrial Punishment
46. Defendants imposed punitive conditions unrelated to legitimate governmental objectives.
COUNT III – Fourteenth Amendment Failure to Protect
47. Defendants failed to protect Plaintiff from known risks of physical and sexual harm.
COUNT IV – First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion
48. Defendants punished Plaintiff for refusing to surrender his Bible.
COUNT V – Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments Unlawful Surveillance and Data Collection
49. Defendants compelled unconstitutional interception, retention, and analysis of communications.
COUNT VI – Sixth Amendment Interference with Attorney–Client Communications
50. Defendants interfered with Plaintiff’s right to confidential consultation with counsel.
COUNT VII – Municipal Liability (Monell)
51. Williamson County’s policies, customs, and deliberate indifference were the moving force behind the constitutional violations.
VI. DAMAGES
52. Plaintiff suffered physical injury, permanent neurological and functional disability, loss of vision, chronic pain, insulin-dependent metabolic disease requiring lifelong medical management, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), severe emotional distress, reputational injury, social stigmatization, loss of housing, destruction of family relationships, loss of professional standing and social influence, diminished future earning capacity, loss of dignity, and a severely reduced quality of life.
VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant:
A. Compensatory damages;
B. Punitive damages against individual Defendants;
C. Declaratory relief declaring Defendants’ conduct unconstitutional;
D. Injunctive relief prohibiting ongoing unconstitutional practices;
E. Injunctive relief requiring removal from custodial or medical roles any individual found to have operated without proper licensure or in deliberate indifference, and prohibiting paid administrative leave in lieu of removal;
F. Referral of findings to appropriate licensing and regulatory authorities;
G. Corrective policies, training, and independent oversight;
H. A public corrective statement by the Williamson County Sheriff’s Office;
I. Permanent injunction prohibiting false or stigmatizing statements absent conviction;
J. Permanent injunction prohibiting retaliation, surveillance, or digital interference without valid judicial authorization;
K. Permanent injunction prohibiting direct contact with Plaintiff outside lawful process;
L. Costs and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
M. Such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
VIII. JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
IX. VERIFICATION
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
__________________________________ LeRoy Nellis II, Pro Se Date: ___________
First Amended Complaint
Added 11 November 2026 to the filing above. The words are the pleading. The home address, telephone, and email in the signature block are redacted on this page.
Download the formatted pleading — PDF, 6 pages, redacted
Western District of Texas
Austin Division
LEROY NELLIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TEXAS, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No.
1:26-cv-02592
Jury trial demanded
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
Plaintiff Leroy Nellis, proceeding pro se, files this First Amended Complaint against the above-named Defendants and would show the Court as follows:
I. NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. This is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief for violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The violations include false arrest, malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence from recorded telephone conversations, denial of medical care, unlawful surveillance and recording in attorney-client meeting rooms, systematic recording and artificial-intelligence analysis of inmate telephone calls through the NCIC system, and the knowing use of expunged records and false charges by Williamson County officials.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
2. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Venue is proper in the Western District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in Williamson County, Texas.
III. PARTIES
3. Plaintiff Leroy Nellis is an individual residing in Travis County, Texas. He is legally blind and has permanent nerve damage. These disabilities were known or should have been known to Defendants.
4. Defendant Williamson County, Texas is a governmental entity that is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
5. Defendant Shawn Dick is the District Attorney for Williamson County, Texas. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
6. Defendant Matthew Lindemann is the Sheriff of Williamson County, Texas (in office since January 1, 2025). He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
7. The following individual Defendants are officers, deputies, and officials of the Williamson County Sheriff’s Office and related agencies, sued in their individual and official capacities: Larry R. Davis, Joshua D. Ransom, Rachael C. Lentz, Luke Cadriel, Ronald W. Barnett, Jamie P. Brooks, Bruce E. Young, Jr., Dianna Y. O’Brien, Christopher T. Watts, Jorge Alvarado, Rickey K. Ladet, Aaron Li, Matthew E. Smith, Matthew Ivie, Rebecca M. Rodriguez, William T. Callahan, and FNU Karg.
8. Defendants John and Jane Does 1 through 50 are additional unknown officers, deputies, investigators, prosecutors, and officials of Williamson County who participated in the acts alleged herein. Their true identities will be substituted as discovery progresses. This includes persons involved in reports and actions connected to Isolde Amador-Melendez and persons who participated in the creation or use of fabricated evidence.
IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
9. Plaintiff was subjected to multiple arrests and detentions in Williamson County based on reports that were false or lacked probable cause, including actions involving Isolde Amador-Melendez and Williamson County law enforcement officers.
10. While detained in the Williamson County Jail, Plaintiff was denied adequate medical care for his known disabilities of legal blindness and permanent nerve damage. Jail personnel were deliberately indifferent to these serious medical needs.
11. In the attorney-client meeting rooms at the Williamson County Jail, there are no telephones. Instead, the rooms contain camouflaged audio and video recording equipment disguised as smoke alarms. This was confirmed in conversations with jail personnel (Nathan and Derrick), who stated that the contractors used cheap equipment for the smoke alarms that contained audio and video recording capability. The same type of equipment is installed throughout the jail and even in the halls of the courthouse. These devices recorded privileged attorney-client communications.
12. These secret recordings violated Plaintiff’s right to confidential communications with counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
13. All NCIC inmate telephones at the Williamson County Jail recorded telephone calls. The system segregated calls by code and fed the recordings into an artificial-intelligence system for analysis. This practice applied to Plaintiff’s calls and was conducted without adequate notice or consent regarding the AI analysis component. The recording and AI analysis went beyond ordinary jail monitoring.
14. Williamson County officials took at least one recorded conversation from the NCIC phone system and fabricated a false document based on that conversation. The fabricated document was then placed into evidence or used against Plaintiff in Williamson County criminal proceedings.
15. Williamson County officials, including District Attorney Shawn Dick, Sheriff Matthew Lindemann, and Sheriff’s Office personnel, included expunged information and false charges in proceedings and reports concerning Plaintiff. This includes reference to a January 16, 2000 Carmel PD Theft (Felony) charge from Indiana (status unknown) and a January 27, 2026 Williamson County Sheriff’s Office Violation of Bond/Protective Order (Misdemeanor A) that was pending. These materials were used despite their expunged or false character.
16. Plaintiff’s former criminal defense attorney, Amber Vasquez of Vazquez Law Firm, is in possession of the complete client file containing evidence of the fabricated or false documentation that was placed into the Williamson County criminal proceedings against Plaintiff, including the document fabricated from the NCIC phone recording, communications, and other materials relevant to the expunged and false charges.
17. These actions by the District Attorney, Sheriff, individual officers connected to reports by Isolde Amador-Melendez, and the fabrication of evidence from NCIC recordings were part of a pattern or practice and contributed to false arrests, malicious prosecution, and other constitutional violations.
18. The policies, customs, and practices of Williamson County—including the use of the NCIC system with AI analysis, the installation and use of hidden recording devices in attorney-client rooms, and the use of fabricated or expunged materials—were the moving force behind the constitutional violations.
19. Additional facts supporting the claims will be supplemented as the full client file from prior counsel and other evidence becomes available.
V. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
20. Count 1: False Arrest / False Imprisonment under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants arrested and detained Plaintiff without probable cause based on false reports, fabricated evidence, and expunged records.
21. Count 2: Malicious Prosecution under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants initiated or continued criminal proceedings against Plaintiff without probable cause, with malice, and based on fabricated and false materials.
22. Count 3: Denial of Medical Care under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs arising from his legal blindness and permanent nerve damage.
23. Count 4: Violation of the Right to Confidential Attorney-Client Communications under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants recorded privileged communications in attorney-client meeting rooms using camouflaged equipment.
24. Count 5: Unlawful Recording and Artificial-Intelligence Analysis of Inmate Telephone Calls under the Fourth Amendment. Defendants systematically recorded Plaintiff’s calls, subjected them to AI analysis, and used the recordings to create fabricated evidence.
25. Count 6: Use of Expunged Records and False Charges under the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants knowingly used expunged information and false charges against Plaintiff in violation of due process.
26. Count 7: Fabrication of Evidence from NCIC Phone Recordings under the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants took a recorded conversation from the NCIC system, fabricated a false document from it, and used that document against Plaintiff.
27. Count 8: Municipal Liability against Williamson County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Monell). The constitutional violations were caused by the County’s policies, customs, or practices regarding the NCIC/AI system, hidden recording devices, and the use of fabricated or expunged materials.
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for:
a. Compensatory and punitive damages against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities;
b. Compensatory damages against Williamson County;
c. Declaratory and injunctive relief;
d. An order requiring production of the complete client file held by Amber Vasquez / Vazquez Law Firm that contains the fabricated documents and related evidence;
e. Costs and such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
_________________________________
Leroy Nellis, Pro Se
[home address redacted]
[telephone redacted]
[email redacted]
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
Other Williamson County cases
Heckman v. Williamson County — Denial of Counsel (Texas Supreme Court, 2012)
In Heckman v. Williamson County, No. 10-0671 (Tex. June 8, 2012), the Texas Supreme Court considered a class action brought by indigent misdemeanor defendants who alleged Williamson County unconstitutionally failed to appoint counsel. The plaintiffs, proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claimed the county's constitutional county judge, county court at law judges, and magistrate judge deprived them of the right to appointed counsel at the first appearance before a judicial officer.
The case reached the Texas Supreme Court on the question of whether indigent defendants accused of misdemeanors in Williamson County were denied their right to counsel. The litigation highlighted the county's practices around appointment of counsel for people who could not afford representation in misdemeanor cases carrying potential jail time.
Lewis v. Williamson County — Arrest, Detention, and "LivePD" Filming
In Scott Phillip Lewis v. Williamson County, Texas, No. 1:21-cv-00074 (W.D. Tex.), plaintiff Scott Phillip Lewis sued Williamson County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Texas Tort Claims Act. Lewis alleged he was arrested on January 25, 2019, for driving while intoxicated, booked into Williamson County Jail, and that his arrest and detention were filmed for the television program "LivePD" and broadcast without his consent.
The district court dismissed the case with prejudice in May 2024. Lewis appealed to the Fifth Circuit (No. 24-50461), arguing the dismissal was duplicative of a prior state case and that all criminal charges were eventually dropped in April 2022 — over three years after the arrest. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal in December 2024.
Acosta v. Williamson County — Jail Medical Care and Conditions
In Acosta v. Williamson County, Texas et al., No. 1:21-cv-00615 (W.D. Tex.), Bernardo Acosta alleged that on May 27, 2021, he was arrested in Williamson County for driving while intoxicated and detained overnight in Williamson County Jail. His complaint alleged that jail officers failed to provide medical care for post-traumatic stress disorder and sleep apnea, and that an officer intentionally slammed his finger in a holding cell door, causing a fracture.
The case generated extensive discovery disputes, including plaintiff's requests for jail records, recordings, and documentation of his incarceration. The court addressed the county's identification of officers involved and ruled on the scope of discovery into jail conditions.
Mitchell v. Ailison — 2025 Section 1983 Action Against Jail Officers
In Mitchell et al v. Ailison, Officer Williamson County Jail, No. 1:2025cv00953 (W.D. Tex., filed June 12, 2025), plaintiff Rashad Dale Mitchell brought a prisoner civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against named Williamson County jail officers. The case, assigned to Judge Alan D. Albright, includes a settlement demand of $25,000 and a jury demand. As of late 2025, motions to dismiss and summons service were pending.
Other Williamson County Litigation
- Tiede v. Collier, No. 1:23-cv-01004 (W.D. Tex.) — a Texas prison excessive-heat conditions case in the Western District of Texas.
- Woods v. Williamson County Sheriff Jail — a pro se § 1983 case alleging inmates were placed outside during a rainstorm while a cell shakedown was conducted.
- Troy Mansfield v. Williamson County, No. 22-186 — a § 1983 lawsuit whose petition for certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court.
What These Cases Have in Common
Across these lawsuits, recurring themes emerge: conditions of confinement at Williamson County Jail, access to medical care for detainees with chronic conditions, the right to appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases, excessive force allegations, and municipal liability under Section 1983. Several cases involve pretrial detainees — people who have not been convicted of any crime — raising heightened constitutional concerns about the conditions of their confinement.
The Williamson County Jail is operated by Williamson County, Texas. As with all litigation, the allegations in these complaints are claims made by plaintiffs and have not all been proven in court. Case outcomes range from dismissal to settlement to pending proceedings.
The same pleading is also on leroynellis.org | leroynellis.blog.